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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Walter Moore respectfully requests that the ldaho Supreme Court retain this case
to clarify or overrule State v. Person, 145 ldaho 293, 178 P.3d 658 (Ct. App. 2008).'
The instant case is before the Court on appeal after Walter Moore obtained ~strada"
relief from his post-conviction action and was resentenced by the district court. The
district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with thirteen years fixed, upon
Mr. Moore's plea of guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. On appeal,
Mr. Moore asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request to
have the district court remove his 2003 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI) and attached Psychosexual Evaluation from the possession of the ldaho
Department of Corrections (hereinafter, IDOC) to prevent its further use by the parole
board in determining whether Mr. Moore will be paroled at the conclusion of the fixed
portion of his sentence. Additionally, Mr. Moore asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him in light of the mitigating factors
present in his case

' As is set forth in detail below, to the extent Mr. Moore's argument is in conflict with
Person, such that a defendant can never challenge the contents of a PSI if not objected
to at the time of the original sentencing hearing, Person should be overruled or clarified
as it is in conflicts with both Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007) and
State V. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261, 971 P.2d 327 (1998). Moreover, overruling or
clarifying Person is necessary because a broad interpretation of Person is manifestly
wrong and unjust.
Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007).

*

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2003, Mr. Moore was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen. (R., pp.22-23.) Mr. Moore entered a plea of guilty to the aforementioned
charge, with the State agreeing to recommend a unified sentence of life, with fifteen
years fixed, and not prosecute him for other alleged conduct. (R., p.28-30.) After
accepting Mr. Moore's plea of guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, the
district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with fifteen years fixed, upon him.
(R., pp.53-56.) Mr. Moore filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's Order
of Judgment and Conviction. (R., pp.57-59.) Mr. Moore's conviction and sentence were
affirmed on appeal.

See State v. Moore, 2004 Unpublished Opinion 477 (Ct. App.

May 24, 2004)~
In June of 2008, the district court granted Mr. Moore's Petition For Post
Conviction Relief (hereinafler, Petition) pursuant to Esfrada, ordering that Mr. Moore be
resentenced. (R., pp.70-71.) The newly assigned district court judge entered an Order
for New Presentence Investigation; Psychosexual Evaluation. (R., pp.74-75.) Prior to
resentencing, defense counsel for Mr. Moore filed a Motion for Removal of Prior
Presentence Investigation from IDOC and Court Records. (R., pp.102-103.) At the
hearing on Mr. Moore's motion, defense counsel argued, in part, that the prior PSI,
attached to which is the prior psychosexual evaluation, should be removed from IDOC
so the parole board cannot use it in evaluating Mr. Moore's parole possibility at the
conclusion of his fixed sentence. (Tr., p.10, Ls.15-22.) The State indicated that it had
no objection to removing the 2003 PSI report from possession of the IDOC. (Tr., p.24,

L.24 - p.1I , L.23.) The district court denied Mr. Moore's motion to remove the 2003 PSI
from the IDOC based on its belief that it did not have the authority to do so. (Tr., p.12,
L.2 - p.13, L.19.)
Mr. Moore then proceeded to sentencing and the district court imposed a unified
sentence of life, with thirteen years fixed, upon him. ( R pp.116-I I

) Mr. Moore filed a

Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Amended Judgment and Sentence.
(R., pp.119-123.) Mr. Moore then filed an ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion for a reduction in sentence, which was denied by the district court.4
(~u~mentation)'

Mr. Moore has filed a motion requesting that this Court take judicial notice of its file in
State v. Moore, S.C. Docket No. 30096 contemporaneously with this brief.
Because Mr. Moore did not support his Rule 35 motion with new information, that
issue is not raised on appeal. See Sfate v. Huffman, 144 ldaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007).

ISSUES
1)

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove the 2003 PSI
from the possession of the IDOC?

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a unified sentence of life,
with thirteen years fixed, upon Mr. Moore, following his plea of guilty to lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen, in light of the mitigating factors present in his
case?

Mr. Moore's Rule 35 motion, his affidavit in support, and the district court's denial is
attached to a Motion to Augment filed contemporaneously with this brief and is cited
herein as "Augmentation."

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion Bv Denvinq Mr. Moore's Motion To Remove His
2003 PSI From The IDOC Because The District Court Failed To Recoqnize It Had
Discretion To Require The IDOC To Relinquish Possession Of The PSI
A.

Introduction
The district court erred by denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove his 2003 PSI

and the attached psychosexual evaluation from the IDOC. The district court abused its
discretion because it failed to recognize that it had any discretion to remove the report
from the IDOC. Mr. Moore requests that this matter be remanded to the district court
with instructions that the IDOC return Mr. Moore's 2003 PSI to the district court.
B.

The District Court Failed To Recognize It Had The Discretion To Require That
The IDOC Return Mr. Moore's 2003 PSI To The District Court To Be Sealed Or
Destroved
Mr. Moore asserts the district court erred in denying his motion for removal of his

2003 PSI from the IDOC. The district court has the discretion to require that the IDOC
return Mr. Moore's 2003 PSI. Therefore, Mr. Moore requests his case be remanded to
the district court with instructions that the 2003 PSI in possession of the IDOC be
returned to the district court to be sealed or destroyed.
In its oral decision on Mr. Moore's Motion for Removal of Prior Presentence
Investigation from IDOC and Court Records, the district court stated, "I don't think I can
order the Department of Corrections to do anything with the information that they
already have. I'm not even sure I have the jurisdiction at this point in time to interfere
with that." (Tr., p.12, Ls.20-24.) The district court then stated that it was denying that

portion of Mr. Moore's motion to require the IDOC to return the 2003 PSI report to the
district court. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1-19.)
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a three part multi-tiered inquiry. State v. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). First the district court must rightly perceive the issue as one of
discretion. Id. Second, the district court must act within the outer boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices. Id.
Finally, the district court must reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
At issue in this case is the district court's failure to recognize it had the discretion
to remedy the issue. Under ldaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) Rule 32(h) the district court is
ultimately responsible for maintaining the PSI. Rule 32(h)(l) provides:
Any presentence report shall be available for the purpose of assisting a
sentencing court. After use in the sentencing procedure, the presentence
report shall be sealed by court order, and thereafter cannot be opened
without a court order authorizing release of the report or parts thereof to a
specific agency or individual. Provided, the presentence report shall be
available to the ldaho Department of Corrections so long as the defendant
is committed to or supervised by the Department, and may be retained by
the Del~artmentfor three vears after the defendant is discharged. The
pre-sentence investigator's own copy of the presentence report similarly is
restricted from use by all but authorized court personnel. Neither the
defendant, defendant's counsel, the prosecuting attorney nor any person
authorized by the sentencing court to receive a copy of the presentence
report shall release to any other person or agency the report itself or any
information contained therein, except as provided in Article 1, Section
22(9) of the ldaho Constitution. Any violation of this rule shall be deemed
contempt of court and subject to appropriate sanctions.
I.C.R. 32(h)(i) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to this Rule, the district court maintains the sealed copy.

The

Department of Correction is only authorized to keep the document for three years after
the defendant is released from its custody.

The Department of Correction's

maintenance of the document is only temporarily and not like the district court's
requirement that it keep the document under seal as part of the criminal file. The PSI
does not belong to the Department of Correction, but instead it belongs to the district
court. The Department of Correction is only entitled to limited possession of the PSI.
Only the district court had the authority to correct and maintain the PSI. The PSI is only
made "available" to the Department of Correction for a limited period of time. The PSI
does not belong to the Department of Correct but instead to the district court. The
Department of Correction's ability to use the PSI flows from the district court's control
over the report.
The ldaho Court of Appeals has recognized that the negative impact of including
improper information in a defendant's PSI is not limited to sentencing issues.
The use of a PSI does not end with the defendant's sentencing. The report
goes to the Department of Corrections and may be considered by the
Commission of Pardons and Parole in evaluating the defendant's
suitability for parole. See I.C.R. 32(h). In addition, if the defendant
reoffends, any prior PSI is usually presented to the sentencing court with
an update report from the presentence investigator. Thus, a PSI follows a
defendant indefinitely, and information inappropriately included therein
may prejudice the defendant even if the initial sentencing court
disregarded such information.
State v. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261, 262, n.1, 971 P.2d 327, 328, n.1 (1998).
In Rodriguez, the district court partially granted the defendant's motion to strike
portions of inadmissible information contained within the PSI report. Id. at 262, 971
P.2d at 328. The Court of Appeals held that the district court didn't abuse its discretion
declining to strike additional information that was properly contained in the PSI report.

Id. at 264, 971 P.2d at 330.

Recently, in Person, the ldaho Court of Appeals had the opportunity to address a
similar argument. In Person, the defendant, Person was convicted of second degree
murder and on direct appeal successfully argued that his ~iranda'rights were violated
during a police interrogation of him. Id. at 295, 178 P.3d at 660. The ldaho Court of
Appeals suppressed portions of Person's statements made to detectives and remanded
his case to the district court. Id. On remand, Person entered a binding ldaho Criminal
Rule I?
plea agreement, wherein the State stipulated to the sentence to be imposed
upon Person. Id. As part of the agreement, Person "waived presentence investigation"
and requested that his sentence be immediately imposed.

Id. The district court

accepted the agreement and imposed the stipulated sentence. Id. After the district
court imposed the new sentence, Mr. Person filed a "Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes
by Retracting 2003 PSI Pursuant to I.C.R. 36 and I.C.R. 32," wherein he asked that the
IDOC return all copies of his prior PSI "for redaction of information derived from his
suppressed statements and correction of 'other inaccuracies"' and that the corrected
PSI be returned to the IDOC. Id. The Person Court held that "a district court's authority
to challenge the contents of a PSI ceases once a judge of conviction and sentence are
issued." Id. at 296, 178 P.3d at 661.
Mr. Moore's case is distinguishable from Person. Unlike Person, where the
defendant challenged the PSI subsequent to the sentencing hearing, after a sentence
was already imposed, Mr. Moore sought to remove the 2003 PSI prior to his
resentencing, which was ordered after the district court concluded that Mr. Moore
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to advise him

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8

of his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination at his original ~entencing.~
(See
R., pp.68-69 (order granting post conviction petition), pp.102-103 (motion for removal of
2003 PSI).) Accordingly, because the district court failed to recognize the bounds of its
discretion, that it had the "prerogative" to replace the 2003 version with the corrected
2008 PSI, Mr. Moore's case should be remanded to the district court with instructions
that the 2003 PSI be removed from the IDOC, such that information inappropriately
included therein will not be used to prejudice Mr. Moore when he seeks parole at the
conclusion of the fixed portion of his sentence.
Alternatively, if this Court concludes that Person stands for the proposition that a
defendant is forever barred from correcting a presentence report after the initial
sentencing hearing if an objection is not made at that time, it should be overruled. This
Court will follow controlling precedent "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." Sfate v. Humphreys,
134 ldaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v.
Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). If Person is given an overly
broad reading in its application, it must be overruled because it conflicts with existing

Although not relevant to the instant case, where Mr. Moore's psychosexual evaluation
was attached to his PSI report, there is a question as to whether the IDOC is ever
entitled to obtain possession of a sealed psychosexual evaluation. Certainly, under
Rule 32(h)(l), the IDOC is entitled to temporary possession of a PSI report. However,
there is no rule authorizing the IDOC to obtain a confidential psychosexual evaluation.
The purpose of sealing a psychosexual evaluation is to prevent it viewing by the general
public and anyone directly connected to the court proceedings. Permitting the IDOC to
possess a confidential psychosexual evaluation is troubling because it can be readily
accessed by parties unrelated to the criminal proceeding, guards and employees of the
IDOC.

precedent, is manifestly wrong, and overruling it is "necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." Id.
In Estrada v. State, this Court held that the petitioner received ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with the psychosexual evaluation. See generally
Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007). Estrada had been denied the
right to the assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advise him that he had
the right to remain silent and not participate in the evaluation. 143 ldaho at 563-565,
149 P.3d at 838-840. This Court remanded the case back to the district court for further
proceedings. Id. 565, 149 P.3dat 840.
Applying Estrada in conjunction with Rodriguez, a defendant must be permitted
to remove a prior, unconstitutionally obtained evaluation, from the possession of the
IDOC, otherwise that defendant will continue be prejudiced by statements he made in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Certainly Mr. Moore's attorney could have and
should have objected to his 2003 evaluation at the time of the initial sentencing hearing.
However, because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the unconstitutionally
obtained statements were included within the earlier evaluation. Without allowing the
district court's authority to control their documents such as the presentence report, the
relief granted in cases such as Estrada has limited affect because the prejudicial impact
of the of the illegally obtained statements lasts long after a sentence is imposed and
executed. See Rodriguez, 132 ldaho at 262, n . l , 971 P.2d at 328, n.1. The purpose of
post conviction proceedings is to prevent a defendant from being harmed by his
counsel's deficient performance and it necessarily follows that when a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel at a sentencing hearing, all prejudicial impact

of the attorney's actions or inactions must be eliminated so that the defendant is placed
in the position he would have been but for his counsel's deficient performance.
Thus, if this Court determines that Person stands for the proposition that a
defendant can never challenge the contents of a PSI after the initial sentencing hearing,
it must be overruled. Accordingly, Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this case be
remanded to the district court with instructions that his 2003 PSI, and all of its contents
(including the psychosexual evaluation), be removed from the possession of the IDOC.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By lmposinq A Unified Sentence Of Life, With
Thirteen Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Moore, Followinq His Plea Of Guiltv To Lewd Conduct
With A Minor Under Sixteen, In Linht Of The Mitiaatinq Factors Present In His Case
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a
sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse
of discretion on the part of the court imposing the sentence."' In order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Moore must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing.
Mr. Moore asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of life,
with thirteen years fixed, is excessive. Mr. Moore is the product of both the physical and

sexual abuse he suffered during childhood.

Mr. Moore reported a friend sexually

abused his brother when he was young and "it is possible that he too, was molested."
(PSI, p.4.) At age 13, Mr. Moore indicated that he was sexually victimized by an older
boy while walking home from school.

(Polygraph, p.5.)

Not only was Mr. Moore

sexually victimized as a childlyoung teen, he was physically abused by his mother. On
one occasion, his mother broke his nose by throwing scissors at him. (Psychosexual
Eval., p.4; PSI, p.4.) Mr. Moore also reported his mother beat him with a baseball bat.
(Psychosexual Eval., p.4.)
Prior to his current conviction, Mr. Moore had never before committed a felony
offense. (PSI, p.3.) In fact, Mr. Moore's record is devoid of any criminal offenses, with
the exception of two speeding violations, one in 1979, and one in 1982. (PSI, p.3.)
Accordingly, the district court failed to adequately consider the fact that Mr. Moore, a 43
year old man at the time of the offense, had no prior criminal convictions on his record
at the time of the offense.
Mr. Moore has expressed his remorse for actions leading to his conviction and
his concern for the victim and the victim's family in this case. In the PSI, Mr. Moore
wrote that "he prays that his victim be allowed to receive counseling." (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Moore stated that since he has been in prison "he has had the opportunity to get to
know guys who have been sexually molested as children" and "has been forced to seek
the long term affects of his crime, especially to those victims who did not seek
counseling." (PSI, p.3.) At sentencing, Mr. Moore reiterated his remorse for his actions,
stating:
I'd like to start off by asking all who knew of my actions for
forgiveness, and I take full responsibility for hurting J.J., and because he

trusted me, I violated that trust. It wasn't just J.J. and the family who were
victimized, it was my family and friends, anybody who read the paper,
those who worked the case on all levels also became victims. I have an
obligation to these people to complete counseling in addition to recovery.

...
I realize that I cannot take back what I've done I can only pray for
those who have been hurt and ask God for peace and healing and that
they would find forgiveness. I have asked God for forgiveness for the
actions which I have committed. I know he has forgiven me. I can only
ask the Court for mercy and a second chance. But this does not excuse
me from my obligation to complete programming and counseling.

(Tr., p.39, Ls.14-23, p.41, Ls.5-13.) Thus, Mr. Moore has taken full responsibility for his
actions and recognizes the harm he has done. Moreover, Mr. Moore is particularly
concerned with the harm he has caused the victims and wants to ensure that they
receive counseling to help them work through the problems he has caused. Not only
does Mr. Moore understand part of his obligation to the victims in this case, but he
recognizes that he too must receive the necessary treatment and counseling to ensure
he never commits the same acts again.
It is important to note that Mr. Moore not only speaks to what he must do to
change, but his actions since his incarceration show his desire to better himself and to
help those around him in paying off his debt to society. Mr. Moore has used his
incarceration to improve his employable skills such that once he is released, he can
once again become a contributing member to society. While incarcerated, he "has been
working hard to learn a trade, electrical blueprints, commercial wiring, residential wiring,
and quite a bit of education in construction and safety." (Tr., p.34, Ls.10-24; see
generally Sentencing packet.)'

Mr. Moore has also held jobs as a tutor, teaching

assistant, and assisted in janitorial work while at the prison. (Tr., p.34, L.24 - p.35, L.8;

Sentencing Packet.) In the PSI, Mr. Moore indicated that he worked as a tutor to other
inmate for three and one-half years and for the last six months leading up to his
resentencing, worked in the library full time. (PSI, p.7.) In fact, while in the Bonner
County jail prior to his resentencing, helped approximately four inmates work on their
GEDs. (Tr., p.37, Ls.12-17.)
Accordingly, in light of the forgoing, Mr. Moore asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing and excessive sentence upon him.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the district court
with instructions that his 2003 PSI be removed from the possession of the IDOC.
Additionally, Mr. Moore requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this

lothday of February, 2010.

&

ERIC D. F EDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

The "Sentencing Packet" was offered by Mr. Moore at sentencing and is included
within Confidential No. 4.
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